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REPLY
In Reply to the Respondent's Brief, the Appellant
submits the following:
1. Despite the very clear language of the Appeals
Court, denying the only grounds asserted by the Respondent (that
there had been an implicit repeal of the 49-10-28 UCA Retirement
Act, by passage of 49-9a-4 UCA,), and the correct finding that
"Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear express language
provided that two disability retirement systems could co-exist
in Utah.", ). (Appeals Court Opinion, P3), Respondent insists
on confusing the two systems.
2. The two systems had different definitions of what
constituted "disability". The Appeals Court Opinion shows the
same confusion, (see footnote, bottom of P. 3)
"1. Ellis concedes he is not "totally disabled" as
defined by the Disability Act and, therefore, does not
qualify for disability benefits under this statutory
scheme."
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Appellant concedes that he does not meet the definition
of disability under the 1983 disability insurance program, since
it requires him to be unable to "perform any renumerative
employment"; Appellant does not concede that he fails to meet
the definition of disability under the 1967 act, "incapacity of
a member to perform the usual duties of his employment".
3. It is Appellant's position that nothing in the 1983
act requires him to meet the 1983 definition in order to qualify
for retirement under the 1967 Act, and that he can qualify for
retirement under 49-10-28 at any time prior to it's repeal in
1987.
Appellant applied
for retirement
in April, 1986,
effective July 1, 1986. At that time the provisions of the 1967
Act were still in effect, and Appellant met all prerequisits of
the 1967 act, necessary to retire under that act. As a matter
of fact, the Board admits that Appellant will be retired under
the parent Retirement Act (not under 49-9a ) when he reaches age
60, because he opted out of the retirement system January 1,
1985, and froze his 20 years of service under 49-10-14 UCA., the
only issue here, is whether he qualified for early medical
retirement.
4. Counsel has argued that because Appellant opted out
of the Retirement Act under 49-10-14 UCA (he was a department
head without Civil Service Tenure) that somehow this deprives
him of his right to early medical retirement.
This is a
smokescreen argument, having nothing to do with the issues. The
Appellant froze his 20 years of vested retirement service
effective
January
1,
1985, but
did
not
withdraw
his
contributions, or relinquish his rights to draw benefits when he
reaches 60 years of age.
5. Counsel persists in arguing that the 1983 Act was a
new program. That simply is not true. Section 49-10-28.5 UCA
(1967) was an almost identical, optional Salary insurance. It,
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like the 1983 Disability Act was not a 'vested right1 portion of
the Retirement Act.
It was just a supplemental insurance
program.
There is no comparison between either insurance
program described in 49-10-28.5 UCA, or the new 49-9a-4, 8, and
the vested right program described in 49-10-28 UCA. The two
insurance programs are more akin to Workmen's Compensation
benefits than they are to the Retirement Act, which probably
explains why they required "Total Disability" in terms of
"inability
to perform
any
renumerative
employment".
By
contrast, 49-10-28 UCA, being part and parcel of the Retirement
Act, is a fully contributed investment program, under which the
participants were manditorily required to participate, they made
contributions, their employer made contributions, and the Board
was to invest those contributions and use the proceeds of
investment to pay the benefits provided for those who by reason
of illness or injury, were no longer able to do their former
jobs.
That is why the Appellant has a Constitutional right to
demand that he be retired, medically, under 49-10-28 UCA, which
was still in full force and effect, fully funded, and available,
up until the Legislature repealed it effective July 1, 1987.
6.
The
key
word,
necessary
to
an
accurate
interpretation of Legislative intent as to the meaning of
49-9a-8 UCA (1983) is "covered".
It is obvious that the
Legislature intended 49-9a-8 to cover total disabilities * as
defined in that chapter (49-9a) after the effective date of the
legislation; by negative implication, if the disability was not
"covered" by the new act, it had no effect, and since
Appellant's disability was not covered by the new act, he still
has recourse under the old act.
Respectfully submitted, this 16th day of December, 1988.

NOTICE OF MAILING
Mailed 10 copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of
Appellant, to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, State Capitol
Building, SLC, Utah 84134; four copies being mailed to Mark A,
Madsen, attorney for the Respondent, 540 East Second South, SLC,
Utah 84102, postage prepaid this 2<f) day of December, 1988.

